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Impulsivity is tightly linked to addiction. However, there are several pathways by means of
which impulsive individuals are more prone to become addicts, or to suffer an addiction
more intensely and for a longer period. One of those pathways involves an inadequate
appraisal or regulation of positive and negative emotions, leading to lack of control over
hazardous behaviors, and inappropriate decisions. In the present work, we assessed
cocaine-dependent individuals (CDI; n = 20), pathological gamblers (PG; n = 21), and
healthy controls (HC; n = 23) in trait impulsivity measures (UPPS-P model’s dimensions),
and decision-making tasks (Go/No-go; delay-discounting task). During the Go/No-go
task, electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded, and Go/No-go stimuli-evoked
potentials (ERP) were extracted. Theory-driven ERP analyses focused on the No-go >
Go difference in the N2 ERP. Our results show that negative urgency is one of the
several psychological features that distinguish addicts from HC. Nevertheless, among the
dimensions of trait impulsivity, negative urgency is unique at independently covarying with
gambling over-pathologization in the PG sample. Cocaine-dependent individuals performed
more poorly than gamblers in the Go/No-go task, and showed abnormal Go/No-go
stimuli-evoked potentials. The difference between the No-go stimulus-evoked N2, and
the Go one was attenuated by severity and intensity of chronic cocaine use. Emotional
dimensions of impulsivity, however, did not influence Go/No-go performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Substance and behavioral addictions are characterized by loss of
control over drives or habits, and by persistent preference for
immediate rewards at the expense of relative net loss (Everitt
and Robbins, 2000). Behavioral neuroscience has modeled these
deficits by using motor inhibition (or impulsive action) and
delay discounting (or impulsive choice) decision-making tasks
(Winstanley et al., 2006; Verdejo-García et al., 2008). However,
there are at least two mechanisms potentially accounting for
impulsive actions and/or choices in addicts: one refers to pre-
existing individual differences within impulsive personality traits,
and the other to the impact of the degree of exposure to drug
dosages or gambling episodes.
With regard to the first mechanism, there are multiple facets
of trait impulsivity that may impact impulsive action and choice,
and thus addiction vulnerability. The UPPS-P model of impul-
sivity has recently emerged as a successful factorial account of
impulsive personality (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001; Cyders and
Smith, 2008; Cándido et al., 2012). In this model, impulsivity
is hypothesized to be composed of five separable dimensions.
Negative urgency refers to the tendency to make poor decisions
under conditions of negative affect; positive urgency refers to the
tendency to make poor decisions under conditions of positive
affect; lack of premeditation is the tendency not to think of the
consequences of an action before engaging in it; lack of perse-
verance refers to the inability to stay focused on long, boring or
difficult tasks; and sensation seeking represents the willingness to
participate in exciting, new, and/or potentially dangerous activ-
ities. Most importantly, impulsivity dimensions in this model
have been proved to correlate with future (prospective) aspects
of addictive behavior, in a meaningful manner (see, for example,
Cyders et al., 2007, 2009; Cyders and Smith, 2008).
With regard to the second mechanism, prolonged stimulants
or gambling exposure can gradually boost impulsive traits and
deter cognitive performance in response inhibition and delay
discounting tests. In terms of behavioral performance, cocaine
users seem disproportionately impaired in response inhibition
tests (Verdejo-García et al., 2007b), whereas pathological gam-
blers (PG) display consistent preference for immediate rewards,
in absence of significant influence of response inhibition deficits
(Kertzman et al., 2011).
In other words, addiction, trait impulsivity, and performance
in delay discounting and response inhibition tasks compound
quite a complex, multifaceted triad, in which disentangling causes
from effects is not always easy. The most straightforward way to
do so is by means of prospective studies, in which personality
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and neuropsychological scores are used to predict the future
emergence of addictive disorders. Cross-sectional studies, com-
paring addicts vs. non-addicts, are more limited in this regard.
Nevertheless, in groups of addicts, it is possible to check for
the existence of functional relations between the degree of expo-
sure to the potentially neurologically damaging factor (e.g., the
amount of drug consumed during the course of addiction)
and the extent of personality and neuropsychological anomalies
(including impulsive choice and impulsive action in lab tasks, and
their neurophysiological correlates). Relationships of this type
are strongly indicative of neurotoxic and/or neuroadaptive effects
(see Albein-Urios et al., 2012a, for a more detailed presentation of
this argument).
In the present work, we compared a group of PG against a
group of cocaine dependent individuals (CDI), and a group of
matched healthy controls (HC), in trait impulsivity dimensions
(UPPS-P), impulsive choice (delay discounting), and impulsive
action (motor inhibition Go/No-go task). Our first aim is to
help to clarify the current state of affairs by carefully estimat-
ing the degree of exposure to cocaine/gambling activities, and
checking for relationships, not only between the clinical category
and personality/impulsive choice/impulsive action anomalies, but
also between those anomalies and exposure estimates, within the
clinical categories.
Complementarily, we have solid reasons to believe that some
light can be shed on this complex pattern of interrelations by
drawing two paths in it: one based on emotion appraisal and
processing, and a second, non-emotional one, mostly related to
other (“cool”) components of executive functioning (Metcalfe
and Mischel, 1999). On this regard, our first working assumption
is the centrality of emotion in the characterization of differ-
ent types of impulsivity. The segregation between emotional and
non-emotional components of impulsivity has indeed a long his-
tory (see Barratt, 1993; Evenden, 1999; Perales et al., 2009), and is
also implicit in the UPPS-P model (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001;
Cyders et al., 2007; Cyders and Smith, 2008). Negative urgency,
positive urgency, and sensation seeking, are by definition strongly
loaded by emotional factors (Joseph et al., 2009). Among them,
positive and negative urgency depend on inadequate appraisal of
(and response to) emotions preceding decisions, whereas sensa-
tion seeking is more related to the anticipation of reward and
the lack of apprehension against the risks involved in its attain-
ment. The other two dimensions—lack of perseverance and lack
of premeditation—are less dependent on emotion. In that sense,
the UPPS-P model emerges as a tool to identify the importance
of emotional vs. non-emotional ingredients of impulsivity in all
kinds of hazardous, risky or pathological behavior.
More generally speaking, emotion is linked to impulsive
behavior in at least two ways: via behavior consequences, and via
behavior antecedents. In support of the first link, there is evi-
dence of a psychological link between reward/punishment and
emotion, so that the neural substrates for them are partially
overlapping (Kringelbach, 2005; Murray, 2008; Quartz, 2009).
Some individuals can be specially (in)sensitive to the affective
value of present or delayed reward and punishment, so that, for
example, punishment-sensitive people can be less prone to take
risks, or reward-sensitive people can be more adventurous and
sensation seeking (Dawe and Loxton, 2004; Franken and Muris,
2006; Reynolds, 2006; Torres et al., submitted). In the second case,
emotions, acting as context for decisions, can turn such decisions
into impulsive ones. Recent studies (see, for example, Albein-
Urios et al., 2012b; Verdejo-García et al., 2013) report strong
evidence on the involvement of inadequate appraisal of emotions
(particularly negative ones) in hazardous behavior.
Our second working assumption is that the two neurobe-
havioral mechanisms theoretically linking brain function to rash
action and addiction (delay discounting sensitivity and motor
inhibition) are also differentially related to emotions. Separate
pieces of previous evidence seem to support this idea. For exam-
ple, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) interpret findings from reward
delay studies in terms of a hot/cool systems theory. The results
reviewed support the idea that increased “cool” system activa-
tion increases the ability to delay gratification, whereas increased
“hot” system activation decreases it. Importantly, emotions gen-
erated incidentally at the time of decision, but not directly related
to the expected, to-be-delayed reward, as well as emotions con-
substantial to the object of decision, can significantly influence
choice (Schmeichel and Inzlicht, 2013).
On the other hand, core motor inhibition mechanisms seem
to be mostly non-emotional, although this statement is more
controversial. A broad exploration of the cognitive processes
and brain areas involved in Go/No-go and other inhibition
tasks can be found in Rubia et al. (2001). The areas identified
comprise parts of the frontal, prefrontal, and parietal cortices,
mostly—although not exclusively—coincident with the “cool”
executive system (although see also Goldstein et al., 2007).
According to Horn et al. (2003), differential Go/No-go stimulus-
evoked early processing is mostly non-emotional, and reflects
the core inhibitory component of the task. Conversely, more
delayed processing recruits limbic and paralimbic structures (pos-
terior orbitofrontal cortex, the temporal poles, and the posterior
cingulate) which are likely to implement the emotional and
motivational aspects of the task. Given this somewhat mixed pat-
tern of results, providing correlations between different aspects
of Go/No-go performance and emotional and non-emotional
dimensions of impulsivity is theoretically valuable.
To sum up, with the present work we intend to add evidence
on the two abovementioned assumptions and, complementar-
ily, to make them converge to test the differential involvement
of the emotional and non-emotional pathways in the two addic-
tive disorders under scrutiny. With that intention in mind, we
interviewed participants in their present and past drug-using
and gambling habits, and we used the UPPS-P model to evalu-
ate impulsive personality in the three groups, the Now-or-later
test (Kirby et al., 1999) for delay discounting/impulsive choice;
and the Go/No-go task (Verdejo-García et al., 2007b) for motor
inhibition/impulsive action.
In addition, during the Go/No-go task, electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) activity was recorded, and Go/No-go stimuli-
evoked potentials (ERP) were extracted. Theory-driven ERP
analyses focused on the N2 component, as observed in fronto-
central electrodes (Jodo and Kayama, 1992; Mathalon et al., 2003;
Miltner et al., 2003; Beste et al., 2011; Smith, 2011; Gajewski
and Falkenstein, 2013) as the potentially best candidate to reflect
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inhibition-related cognitive activity during the Go/No-go task
(Mathalon et al., 2003; see Folstein and Van Petten, 2007, for
a review). Moreover, there are numerous reports of the rela-
tionship between N2 magnitude and addictive behavior, and,
specifically, a reduction of the No-go > Go difference and the
underlying source activations in samples of clinically addicted
patients (Sokhadze et al., 2008; Dong et al., 2010; Luijten et al.,
2011; Pandey et al., 2012). Complementarily, ERP measures are
frequently more sensitive than behavioral ones, and can provide
convergent evidence of the effect of key manipulations, especially
when the behavioral effects of such manipulations are subtle (see,
for example, Karayanidis et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2005).
For analysis and presentation purposes, our aim is divided
into three specific research targets: (1) To quantify the influ-
ence of emotional and non-emotional dimensions of impul-
sivity, as measured by the UPPS-P model, on cocaine-use and
gambling. Impulsivity dimensions are used, to postdict belong-
ingness to clinical categories, but also to check for correlations
with gambling episodes/cocaine dosage exposure estimates. (2)
To check for the existence of differences between the clinical
and non-clinical groups, as well as exposure-mediated effects
on performance in Go/No-go and delay-discounting tasks (and
on evoked EEG activity during the Go/No-go task). Finally (3),
and in order to add evidence on the linkage between impul-
sive choice/action and emotional/non-emotional dimensions of
impulsivity, we measured the differential impact of such dimen-
sions on the two decision-making tasks, without taking addiction
into account. The consequences of our results on the triadic map-
ping between impulsivity, decision-making, and addiction, and




Cocaine-dependent individuals (CDI; n = 20) were recruited
from the Proyecto Hombre rehabilitation centers in Granada
and Málaga (Spain) between January 2011 and July 2012.
Pathological gamblers (PG; n = 21) were recruited from
AGRAJER (Granadian Association of Gamblers in Rehabilitation,
Granada, Spain) between October 2010 and July 2012. Most
controls (n = 23) were recruited among non-drug using, non-
gambling partners, and acquaintances (with no familiar link-
age) of individuals in the clinical groups. The rest of them
were recruited by incidental sampling, in such a way that their
sociodemographic characteristics were not far from the clinical
groups.
The inclusion criteria were (i) meeting DSM-IV criteria for
cocaine dependence (CDI group) or pathological gambling (PG
group)—as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV Disorders—Clinician Version (SCID; First et al., 1997);
(ii) having a minimum abstinence interval of 15 days for all sub-
stances of abuse except nicotine, as determined by weekly urine
toxicological tests (CDI) or cross validated therapist- and self-
reports (PG). Exclusion criteria were: (i) the presence of any other
Axis I or Axis II comorbid disorders with the exception of nico-
tine dependence; (ii) the presence of history of head injury or any
diseases affecting the central nervous system.
The participants volunteering in this study were the same as
those in Torres et al. (submitted). The specific socio-demographic
characterization of the three groups is reported in Torres et al.’s
abovementioned study. For the HC, PG, and CDI groups, respec-
tively, sample sizes were 23, 21, and 20; proportions of females
0.09, 0.10, and 0.00; mean (SD) age 30.13 (8.64), 31.43 (5.92),
and 34.75 (6.51); mean (SD) education years 14.55 (3.16), 13.90
(4.66), and 15.05 (4.21); and mean (SD) IQ 106.25 (10.22), 101.10
(9.07), and 105.35 (9.09). In all cases, differences between groups
were not significant (min p = 0.11).
The study counted with explicit permission from the
University of Granada’s ethics committee. Prior to psycholog-
ical and neuropsychological assessment, all participants were
informed about the objectives and characteristics of the study, and
signed an informed consent form. All of them were compensated
with 36 C for their participation, independently of performance.
Upon consent, all participants were questioned about their
age and number of education years, and were assessed using
the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT), the Interview for
Research on Addictive Behavior (IRAB), the UPPS-P impulsivity
scale, the Now-or-later task, and the Go/No-go task.
PSYCHOMETRIC INSTRUMENTS
UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale (Verdejo-García et al., 2010)
In order to assess impulsivity, we used the Spanish version of
the original 59-item questionnaire (Verdejo-García et al., 2010).
This scale allows for a multidimensional assessment of impulsiv-
ity: positive, urgency, negative urgency, (lack of) premeditation,
(lack of) perseverance, and sensation seeking.
Interview for Research on Addictive Behaviors (IRAB,
Verdejo-García et al., 2005)
As noted in the introduction, a key factor in the present study
is the degree of exposure to cocaine and gambling activities (in
the CDI and PG groups, respectively). Most psychometric tools
developed for clinical purposes do not measure exposure in an
isolated manner (disregarding craving intensity, perception of
lack of control over the addictive behavior, social and family prob-
lems, financial problems, and other symptoms and consequences
of addiction).
All of those side factors are irrelevant to the current study.
Actually, they would likely blur drug/gambling exposure effects.
Hence, information about lifetime amount and duration of use
of the different drugs was collected using the IRAB (Verdejo-
García et al., 2005). The IRAB is inspired by applied and exper-
imental behavior analysis, and was not developed to estimate
the clinical significance of addiction, but to quantify the most
important parameters of drug use behaviors (frequency, duration,
amount), independently of the clinical status of the participant
and the accompanying symptomatology. All the participants in
the three groups went through the full IRAB interview. Here,
however, we will consider only two composite measures yielded
by the interview: (1) monthly amount of each drug consumed,
in grams/month, and (2) severity, or estimated lifetime amount
of drug consumed. In order to avoid extremely skewed dis-
tributions, monthly amount and severity were translated into
within-design rank scores for all analyses. A more detailed display
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of IRAB results for the three groups can be found in Torres et al.
(submitted, Appendix 1).
The IRAB has not been yet developed for gambling activities,
so, in order to have equivalent measures for gambling and cocaine
use, gamblers were questioned about the amount of money they
used to gamble per month (in euros), and the lifetime duration
of regular gambling (in months), across the whole course of their
addiction. That is, the same questions used in the IRAB for reg-
istering drug use, were adapted to register the two key gambling
parameters. Following the same procedure used with cocaine use
parameters, severity of gambling was computed as the product of
such factors, and then translated into within-design rank scores.
The Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT, Kaufman and Kaufman,
1990)
The K-BIT has been standardized and utilized widely, in both
clinical and research settings, to assess cognitive abilities. It com-
prises measures of verbal and non-verbal intelligence and takes
10–30 min to administer. For control matching purposes, we will
use only the compound IQ total score.
DECISION-MAKING TASKS
Go/No-go
A computer-based implementation of the Go/No-go task was
used (Verdejo-García et al., 2007b). The task consisted of 200 tri-
als. In the first 100 trials (pre-switch), participants were asked
to press any key as quickly as they could whenever the Go
stimulus (a letter) was presented, and to withhold the response
when the No-go stimulus (a different letter) was presented. The
assignation of stimuli to the Go and No-go conditions was
counterbalanced across subjects. In the second 100 trials of the
task (post-switch), participants were asked to switch the assig-
nation of the response from the Go to the No-go stimulus; in
other words, they were asked to respond to the previously No-
go stimulus and not to respond to the previously go stimulus.
The proportion of Go vs. No-go trials on both phases (pre-
and post-switch) was 80/20. The inter-trial interval (ISI) was
set at 100 ms, and each stimulus was presented during 1000 ms.
Auditory feedback (one of two distinctive sounds) was pro-
vided after each response to indicate whether that response had
been right or wrong. If participants did not respond in the
1000 ms response window, the two same sounds were used as
positive and negative feedback for not responding. That is, if
no response was given, the same sounds indicated whether the
absence of response had been right (No-go trials) or wrong
(Go trials). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly
as they could; however, in order to enforce time pressure, all
responses given more than 400 ms after the stimulus were accom-
panied by the message “late,” displayed on the center of the
screen.
This version of the task was longer, but virtually identical to the
one used by Verdejo-García et al. (2010). In previous implemen-
tations and pilot studies with the task, we have observed that false
alarms (commission errors) and misses (omission errors) tend to
become less frequent as the task progresses, which tends to gen-
erate performance floor and ceiling effects. The switch between
phases was included to prevent such effects and boost the task’s
sensitivity to manipulations. Similarly, time pressure on responses
(400 ms) prevents floor effects in false alarm rates’ analyses, and
tends to increase the magnitude of the No-go > Go N2 difference
(Sokhadze et al., 2008).
Now-or-later (Kirby et al., 1999)
This paper-and-pencil task presents participants with 27 hypo-
thetical two-option choices between an immediate small reward,
and a delayed larger one (e.g., would you prefer 55 C now, or
110 C in 15 days?). The 27 items are pairs of imaginary mon-
etary rewards varying in amount. Although responses allow for
the calculation of the discount parameter (k), namely, the rate
at which reward looses subjective utility across time, the calcu-
lation of such a parameter requires certain assumptions about the
best-fitting time-utility function. Among the several theory-free
possible dependent measures, we selected the simplest one, the
total number of decisions favoring the immediate reward, as the
main measure of reward-delay sensitivity.
ERP EXTRACTION AND ANALYSIS
EEG activity was recorded exclusively during the Go/No-go task.
EEGs were recorded from 62 scalp locations using tin electrodes
arranged according to the extended 10–20 system mounted on
an elastic cap (Brain Products, Inc.), and referenced online to
FCz. Vertical and horizontal eye activity were recorded from one
monopolar electrode placed below the left eye, and one monopo-
lar electrode located in a straight line at the outer canthi of
the right eye. Two scalp electrodes were attached to mastoids.
All electrode impedances during recording were below 5 k.
EEG and EOG were sampled at 1000 Hz and amplified using
a 0.016–1000 Hz band-pass filter. Subsequently, all EEG record-
ings were downsampled to 250 Hz, band-pass filtered using a
0.1–25 Hz 12 db/octave, re-referenced offline to average activity
of the mastoids electrodes, and FCz activity was recovered. Offline
signal preprocessing was done using EEGLAB software (Delorme
and Makeig, 2004; freely available at http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab).
EEG recordings were segmented from −200 to +300 ms, time-
locked to the Go/No-go stimulus onset. Epochs were corrected
for ocular artifacts by first computing the SOBI ICA decompo-
sition (Belouchrani et al., 1993, 1997; Cardoso and Souloumiac,
1996, see also Tang et al., 2004) as identified by the ADJUST algo-
rithm (Mognon et al., 2011). Other artifacts were subsequently
removed using an automatic rejection procedure: segments were
excluded for the remaining analyses when amplitudes were out-
side the ±100 μV range. Afterwards, segments were categorized
as belonging to the Go or the No-go conditions. After the artifact
correction procedure a minimum of 12 trials for the No-go and
57 for Go segments were retained for further processing.
The N2 amplitude was computed as the peak-to-peak dif-
ference between the most positive peak in the 160–220 ms time
window and most negative peak in the 240–300 ms time window
(see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Smith, 2011, for a similar proce-
dure). Given that the No-go > Go N2 difference is especially neat
over frontocentral electrodes and independent of the reference
(Jodo and Kayama, 1992; Mathalon et al., 2003; Miltner et al.,
2003; Yeung and Nieuwenhuis, 2009; Smith, 2011), we used Fz,
FCz, and Cz for testing between-group differences.
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SOURCE LOCATION
Standardized Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography
(sLORETA) was used for estimating the 3-D cortical distri-
bution of current density underlying scalp activity. sLORETA,
computations were done using the MNI152 template, with the
3D space solution restricted to cortical gray matter, according
to the probabilistic Talairach atlas (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988). The cortical gray matter is partitioned in 6239 voxels
at 5 mm spatial resolution. Brodmann anatomical labels are
reported using MNI space. Standardized sLORETA current
source densities with no regularization method were obtained
from 61 channels (after recovering FCz) for each participant
in each condition and for each time point in each feedback
condition.
Brain localization analysis was carried out according to the
following steps: first, a single measure of the activation of each
voxel for the N2 interval (240–300 ms) was computed, by aver-
aging voxel activations across the whole interval, and correcting
by the average activity at the 160–220 interval. Second, we com-
puted the correlation (across participants) between that averaged
current density and the magnitude of the No-go > Go N2 dif-
ference, for each voxel and each feedback condition. And third,
those areas in which at least 10 voxels were found to signifi-
cantly correlate with the No-go > Go N2 difference score were
identified. For a more detailed description of this source loca-
tion rationale see Catena et al. (2012). For a virtually identical
combination of peak-to-peak N2 amplitude computation, and
time-window averaging for current source density estimation, see
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2003).
RESULTS
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPULSIVITY DIMENSIONS AND
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR
Impulsivity dimensions and belongingness to clinical groups
Forward stepwise binomial regression analyses were carried out
to test whether impulsivity dimensions were indicative of belong-
ingness to the clinical groups. In the first one, the five UPPS-P
dimensions entered the analysis as independent factors, and the
clinical category [addicts (PG, CDI) vs. non-addicts (HC)] as
dependent variable.
Stepwise regression is recommended over simultaneous
regression for small samples. In the step 0 of this procedure
the five impulsivity dimensions are included in a full regression
model. In following steps, the variables are added one-by-one,
in accordance with their predictive value. Only significant vari-
ables are introduced in the prediction equation. In our case, the
process stopped at step 3, after including negative urgency, lack
of premeditation and sensation seeking. The three-dimension
binomial regression model correctly classified 82.8% of the cases.
As displayed in Table 1, negative urgency, lack of premeditation,
and sensation seeking were independently indicative of addic-
tion. Both negative urgency and lack of premeditation were direct
postdictors of addiction, whereas sensation seeking was a sign of
non-addiction.
Secondly, a similar analysis was carried out to test whether
impulsivity dimensions could distinguish between the two clin-
ical categories (PG vs. CDI). Neither the full model nor any of
Table 1 | Forward binomial regression analysis (step 3) of clinical
addiction [(CDI + PG) vs. HC] upon impulsivity dimensions.
B SE Wald p
Negative urgency 1.084 0.334 10.517 0.001
Lack of premeditation 0.958 0.357 7.210 0.007
Sensation seeking –0.746 0.340 4.801 0.028
B, standardized regression parameter; SE, standard error; Wald, contrast statis-
tic; p, alfa error.
the dimensions were indicative of the clinical category in this case
(min p = 0.16).
Impulsivity dimensions and addiction severity
The model resulting from regressing gambling severity (in the PG
group) over the five UPPS-P dimensions was significant (R2 =
0.25), but only negative urgency was included in it, [β = 0.50,
t(20) = 2.53, p = 0.02]. The other four dimensions were far from
significance (min p = 0.22). In the case of cocaine dependent
individuals, neither the full regression model nor any of the
UPPS-P dimensions was significantly predictive of cocaine use
severity (computed for the CDI only; min p = 0.27).
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLINICAL AND NON-CLINICAL GROUPS IN
DECISION-MAKING TASKS
Go/No-go Task
Behavioral results. A hit rate (h) was computed as the number of
hits (responses to Go trials) divided by the sum of hits and misses
(non-responses to Go trials), for each 25-trial block of the task.
Similarly, a false alarm rate (f ) was computed as the number of
false alarms (responses to No-go trials) divided by the sum of false
alarms and correct rejections (non-responses to No-go trials), for
each 25-trial block of the task.
A group (HC, PG, CDI) × block (1–8) MANOVA on false
alarm rates yielded a significant effect of group [Wilks’  = 0.63,
p = 0.05]. Šidák-corrected post-hoc tests revealed a significant
difference between PG and CDI in block 4 (p = 0.02), but not
between PG and HC (p = 0.83), nor between HC and CDI (p =
0.25). Analogous group × block MANOVAs on hit rates and hit
latencies did not yield any significant effect (min p = 0.46).
In order to test potential mediating effects of addiction severity
we carried out MANCOVAs across blocks, with addiction severity
as a continuous covariate, for mean false alarm rates, mean hit
rates, and mean hit latencies, separately for PG and CDI. None of
such analysis yielded any significant effect of severity or intensity
(min p = 0.12).
N2. Figure 1 displays ERP waveforms, time-locked to the
Go/No-go stimulus, separately for Go (left panel) and No-go
stimuli (middle panel). The right panel represents the No-go
> Go N2 difference for the three groups. No-go and Go N2
amplitudes were submitted to a 3 (group: HC, CDI, PG) × 2
(type of trial: No-go, go) × 3 (channel: FCz, Cz, Fz) repeated
measures analysis of variance. Such an ANOVA yielded main
effects of the type of trial, F(1, 61) = 63.00, MSE = 5.01, p <
0.01, and its interaction with group, F(2, 61) = 6.65, p < 0.01. No
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FIGURE 1 | ERP waveform across groups (HC: Healthy Controls, PG:
Pathological gamblers, CDI: Cocaine-dependent individuals) at FCz,
time-locked to the Go stimulus (left panel), and the No-go
stimulus (middle panel). The right panel displays the No-go
> Go N2 difference (the difference in N2 amplitudes between Go
and No-go stimuli) for the three groups. The marks indicate
the time frames used for the computation of the No-go > Go N2
difference.
other main or interaction effects were significant. Analyses within
the interaction yielded a group effect for the No-go condition,
F(2, 61) = 3.83, p < 0.03, but not for the Go one, F(2, 61) = 0.05.
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated that nega-
tive amplitudes were larger for HC than for CDI (p = 0.03). No
differences were observed between HC and PG (p = 0.58), or
between PG and CDI (p = 0.10). No-go vs. Go differences were
significant for all the groups, t(23) = 6.28, p < 0.01, t(19) = 5.07,
p < 0.01, and t(19) = 2.24, p = 0.04, respectively, for HC, PG,
and CDI groups.
Correlations between cocaine use severity and monthly use
and the No-go > Go N2 difference were both significant (r =
0.40, p < 0.01, and r = 0.43, p < 0.01, for severity and intensity,
respectively). Restricting the analysis to the CDI group, the differ-
ential N2 effect was correlated only with use intensity (r = 0.57,
p < 0.01), but not with use severity (p = 0.45). Given that the
No-go > Go N2 effect has a negative sign, the direct correla-
tions indicate that severity and intensity attenuated the difference
between the No-go stimulus-evoked N2, and the Go N2.
Gambling intensity and severity did not correlate with the dif-
ferential N2 effect (independently of whether the analysis was
performed for the whole sample, or only for the PG group; all
p > 0.22).
Source location. Using the bootstrapping approach to control
for multiple comparisons, included in the sLoreta package, we
observed several clusters of voxels that significantly correlated
with No-go > Go N2 difference scores in the whole sample of
participants (Table 2; Figure 2). As expected, the size of the No-
go > Go N2 difference was found to be associated to increased
activation in a broad network of frontal and prefrontal cortices,
predominantly in the left hemisphere.
Moreover, the correlation between the No-go > Go difference
and peak voxel activation was significantly larger for the HC
Table 2 | Cortical areas identified to significantly correlate with No-go
> Go N2 difference scores in the whole sample of participants.
Lobe Structure BA K X Y Z T
L Limbic lobe Anterior cingulate 32 33 −5 15 35 −5.46
L Limbic lobe Cingulate gyrus 24 23 −5 10 30 −6.17
L Frontal lobe Superior frontal
gyrus
11 20 −20 65 −10 −5.48
L Frontal lobe Superior frontal
gyrus
10 60 −20 65 0 −6.04
L Frontal lobe Precentral gyrus 9 43 −35 5 40 −5.09
L Frontal lobe Superior frontal
gyrus
8 56 −20 25 50 −5.72
L Frontal lobe Precentral gyrus 6 108 −35 0 30 −5.35
R Frontal lobe Medial frontal
gyrus
8 14 0 20 50 −4.70
R Limbic lobe Cingulate gyrus 24 26 5 10 30 −7.79
R Limbic lobe Cingulate gyrus 32 24 0 15 35 −5.69
BA, Brodmann area; K, cluster size; X, Y, Z, Spatial coordinates; T, contrast
statistic.
All p’s < 0.001.
group than for the CDI group in the left BA10 area (r = 0.57
and –0.11, for HC and CDI, p < 0.01) and the left BA11 area
(r = 0.61 and 0.11, for HC and CDI, p = 0.03). This suggests an
abnormal functioning of these areas in the CDI group.
Now or later task
The number of trials in which the decision favored the
immediate-reward option in the now or later task was taken as
the main measure of sensitivity (intolerance) to reward delay.
Mean (SD) scores were 10.52 (3.75), 17.00 (4.86), and 15.15
(4.59), for HC, PG, and CDI, respectively. The group effect was
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FIGURE 2 | Topographical localization of the cortical areas identified to significantly correlate with No-go > Go N2 difference scores in the whole
sample of participants.
strongly significant [F(2, 64) = 12.72, MSE = 19.38, p < 0.01].
Šidák-corrected post-hoc tests revealed significant differences
between HC and PG (p < 0.01), and between HC and CDI (p <
0.01), but not between CDI and PG (p = 0.46).
Restricted linear regression analyses with severity as inde-
pendent variable, and sensitivity to reward delay as dependent
measure, were carried out for the PG and the CDI groups. In
none of the two cases was severity significantly predictive of
elevated sensitivity to reward delay [t(20) = 1.06, p = 0.30; and
t(19) = 1.89, p = 0.08, for PG and CDI groups, respectively].
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMPULSIVITY DIMENSIONS AND
DECISION-MAKING TASKS
For the Go/No-go task, MANCOVAs across blocks, with the five
UPPS-P dimensions as continuous covariates, were carried out
on false alarm rates, hit rates, and hit latencies. No effects on false
alarm and hit rates were close to significance. However, lack of
premeditation and lack of perseverance exerted significant effects
on latencies [Wilks’  = 0.74, p = 0.04, and Wilks’  = 0.60,
p < 0.01, respectively]. The effect of lack of premeditation was
restricted to block 4 [F(1, 58) = 4.78, MSE = 610.59, p = 0.03],
and the effect of lack of perseverance to block 2 [F(1, 58) = 9.81,
MSE = 830.74, p < 0.01]. The partial correlation between lack
of premeditation and hit latency in block 4 (controlling for the
other UPPS-P dimensions) was r = 0.38. Complementarily, the
partial correlation between lack of perseverance and hit latency
in block 2 was r = 0.28. In both cases, impulsivity significantly
slowed decisions down.
Finally, the five UPPS-P dimensions were used as predictors
of sensitivity to reward delay in a stepwise regression analysis.
Negative urgency emerged as the only significantly predictive
dimension [β = 0.43, t(63) = 3.74, p < 0.01] included in the
regression model.
DISCUSSION
Our general research aim was to test whether emotional and non-
emotional dimensions of impulsivity were differentially predic-
tive of decision-making and addictive behavior in three samples
of PGs, CDIs, and HCs.
The first specific research target was to use impulsivity dimen-
sions to postdict belongingness to clinical categories, and to
check for correlations between impulsivity dimensions and gam-
bling episodes/cocaine dosage exposure. With that aim in mind,
regression analyses were carried out to estimate the value of
impulsivity dimensions as postdictors of the clinical category
(addicts vs. non-addicts, and PG vs. CDI). Only negative urgency
(but not positive urgency), lack of premeditation (in a posi-
tive direction), and sensation seeking (in a negative direction)
were indicative of selective inclusion in the groups of addicted
individuals.
Although none of the dimensions discriminated between the
two clinical groups (CDI, PG), an important difference between
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them emerged when the same dimensions were used as post-
dictors of addiction severity. Negative urgency independently
covaried with gambling severity in PG, but did not predict cocaine
use severity in CDI. This is consistent with previous reports that
negative urgency is a sign of overpathologization in addictive pro-
cesses (e.g., Michalczuk et al., 2011), but not with those in which
negative urgency has been linked to cocaine neurotoxic effects.
Although some recent works hypothesize a relationship between
cocaine dependence severity and negative urgency (Albein-Urios
et al., 2012a; Cándido et al., 2012), direct evidence of such a
relationship is sparse (Verdejo-García et al., 2007a). Thus, the
question of whether negative urgency is involved in overpathol-
ogization of different types of addictive processes, or has a priv-
ileged role in gambling remains open. Still, the neat relationship
between gambling severity and negative urgency discards the pos-
sibility that such a relationship is exclusively mediated by cocaine
neurotoxicity.
Our second research target was to check for the existence
of differences between clinical and non-clinical groups, as well
as exposure-mediated effects on performance in Go/No-go and
delay-discounting tasks, and on evoked EEG activity during the
Go/No-go task. The results from previous studies suggest that
cocaine use, but not pathological gambling, relates to perfor-
mance deficits in response inhibition skills (see Fillmore and
Rush, 2002; Verdejo-García et al., 2007b; Kertzman et al., 2011;
Van Holst et al., 2012). Accordingly, our results show that CDIs,
but not PGs, perform abnormally in the Go/No-go task. CDIs
presented focal increases of false alarms (commission errors). In
parallel, and most importantly, ERP results showed an abnor-
mal pattern of Go/No-go stimuli-evoked EEG activity in the CDI
group (the No-go > Go N2 difference in the CDI group was the
smallest among the three groups). The deleterious effect on N2
was mediated by cocaine dosage exposure. This pattern of results
is compatible with the well-known association between cocaine
consumption and malfunctioning of motor inhibition mecha-
nisms (Kaufman et al., 2003; Garavan et al., 2008), and also with
the proposal that such malfunctioning is at least partially due to
neurotoxic dosage exposure effects.
In contrast to this difference between clinical groups found in
the Go/No-go task, both CDIs and PGs were more sensitive than
HCs to reward delay, as measured by the now-or-later decision-
making task. In this case, neither the two groups of addicts
differed between them, nor the effect was mediated by cocaine use
or gambling severity. Consequently, the finding by Kertzman et al.
(2011) that gamblers discount reward more rapidly than other
addicts has not been replicated.
Results on source localization complemented the ones on the
N2 ERP. The areas involved in the generation of the No-go > Go
N2 difference (in the whole sample) are mostly coincident with
the ones described in previous works. Reporting the involvement
of pre-SMA and anterior cingulate is common to virtually all rel-
evant studies. A variety of other dorsal, lateral, and anterior areas
of the prefrontal cortex have been reported to functionally inter-
act with these (Rubia et al., 2001; Horn et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2003; Lavric et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a,b; Tanji
and Hoshi, 2008; Zheng et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2013) in the
generation of the No-go > Go N2 difference.
Also with regard to source location, some mention needs to
be made about group differences. As noted above, left BA10
and BA11 were unique at correlating with the N2 differential
effect in the control group, but not in the CDI group (which
is suggestive of abnormal functioning of these areas in cocaine
addicts). Among the different areas involved in Go/No-go per-
formance, Horn et al. (2003) specifically attributed a temporally
early, inhibitory role to BA10/11. Zheng et al. (2008), on the
other hand, attributed a similar inhibitory role to left BA10.
Importantly, none of the areas mentioned by Horn et al. as poten-
tially involved in the emotional aspects of Go/No-go performance
(posterior orbitofrontal cortex, the temporal poles, and the poste-
rior cingulate) are involved either in differential N2 generation, or
in HC-CDI source location differences in the present study. This
pattern of data thus suggests that the deleterious effect of cocaine
addiction on the Go/No-go task mainly affects its inhibition
component.
The last research target was aimed at completing the triadic
mapping between addictions, impulsivity, and decision-making.
Therefore, we measured the impact of impulsivity on decision
making, without taking addiction into account. Lack of pre-
meditation and lack of perseverance slowed down responses in
the Go/No-go task. Although such a result seems counterin-
tuitive, previous results show that, in speeded decision-making
tasks, impulsivity interferes with response selection. For example,
Expósito and Andrés-Pueyo (1997) found that “more impulsive
Ss are more affected by stimulus-response incompatibility and
therefore present higher latencies” (p. 696). Further implications
of such a result go beyond the aims of the present study1.
Still, the impulsivity dimensions involved in the latency effect
(lack of premeditation and lack of perseverance), were only
partially coincident with the ones related to addiction (lack of
premeditation, sensation seeking, and negative urgency), and not
coincident at all with the one predicting gambling severity (neg-
ative urgency). On the other hand, the impulsivity dimension
predicting sensitivity to reward delay was the same one found to
be predictive of gambling severity (negative urgency). Both the
lack of involvement of emotional dimensions in Go/No-go per-
formance, and the involvement of negative urgency in reward
delay sensitivity are partially contradictory with Cyders and
Coskunpinar’s (2011a; although see Cyders and Coskunpinar,
2011b) findings on the relationship between trait and neuropsy-
chological measures of impulsivity. Although our source location
and behavioral results are fully congruent with each other, this
apparent dissonance probably deserves further investigation.
In summary, among the emotional dimensions of impul-
sivity, negative urgency (but not positive urgency) has been
observed to be selectively involved in addiction, independently of
its type (pathological gambling, cocaine dependence). The tight
link between negative urgency and emotionally-charged decision-
making processes is reinforced by the fact that negative urgency
1In short, it seems to support the idea that impulsivity affects the decisional
aspects of response selection in the Go/No-go task. This interpretation goes
against the idea of motor impulsivity as mere disinhibition, namely, the mal-
functioning of a central inhibitory mechanism (see also Donkers and Van
Boxtel, 2004; Spinella, 2004; Perales et al., 2009, for discussions on the matter).
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was the only dimension significantly predicting sensitivity to
reward delay in the delay discounting task. Furthermore, negative
urgency was specifically related to gambling overpathologization.
This effect is compatible with the possibility that gambling (large
amounts of money for long periods) is fueled by negative emo-
tions and moods, and such emotions and moods might operate as
gambling triggers (Oakes et al., 2011, 2012; Williams et al., 2012).
And, the other way round, it is also compatible with the possibility
that dosage-like exposure to gambling episodes generates sensiti-
zation and neuroadaptive effects (Robinson and Berridge, 2003;
Mathewson, 2009).
Results on sensation seeking probably deserve a short digres-
sion. Rather counterintuitively, sensation seeking scores were
lower in both samples of addicted individuals, and were inde-
pendently and inversely indicative of belongingness to any of the
clinical samples. As noted in the introduction, sensation seek-
ing has been shown to be linked to reward delay sensitivity, and
to be a significant predictor of recreational, non-clinical drug
use (Cyders and Coskunpinar, 2011a,b; Torres et al., submit-
ted). This can be taken as independent evidence of the transition
from positive to negative emotion-driven impulsivity in drug-use
pathologization.
Among the non-emotional dimensions of impulsivity, lack of
premeditation was found to be simultaneously involved in the two
types of addiction, and in delaying Go/No-go decisions. However,
in agreement with previous evidence, the effect of addiction on
the Go/No-go task was limited to CDI, and was of a different
nature (namely, an increased focal false alarm rate, and abnor-
mal Go/No-go stimulus evoked cortical activity). In other words,
the effects of impulsivity on Go/No-go decision-making and
addictive processes involve different neurocognitive mechanisms.
Impulsivity is not by itself responsible for the decision-making
anomalies in cocaine addicts revealed by the Go/No-go task.
This study holds relevant strengths and noteworthy limita-
tions. Some limitations are: first, the relatively small sample size
of the clinical groups, which may have impacted the statistical
power of multivariate contrasts. Secondly, the number of valid
trials in the Go/No-go task (particularly, in the case of No-go tri-
als) was too small to analyze ERPs dynamically, that is, trying to
capture the changes in cortical activity occurring during the task
(in a block-by-block fashion, or across phases). Unfortunately,
any attempts to analyze the task in parts rendered the signal-to-
noise ratio too low to capture any significant effect. And finally,
it is important to mention the limitation of the current design
to capture causality in the associations between emotional and
non-emotional pathways to impulsive personality and impulsive
action and choice and drug use behavior. As acknowledged in
the introduction, such causal relationship can only be tracked
by longitudinal studies. On the other hand, its major strengths
are the use of a multidimensional approach to impulsive traits
and impulsive decisions, measuring both emotional and non-
emotional pathways to impulsive action and impulsive choice,
and combining behavioral and electrophysiological approaches.
Another relevant strength is the comparison between two clini-
cal groups of addicted individuals who were matched in terms of
baseline cognition (IQ) and clinical features, but strikingly dif-
fered in their impulsive action patterns, which, as discussed, have
relevant implications both from the basic science and the clinical
perspectives.
FINAL REMARKS
The results presented here make two relevant contributions to the
current literature. First, they show that aspects of impulsivity with
a core component of negative emotion processing and appraisal
play a key role in decision making (reward delay sensitivity), and
addiction (gambling severity and intensity). And, secondly, they
show that some key aspects of decision-making and neurobehav-
ioral anomalies in addicts are independent of such factors. CDIs,
but not PGs, performed abnormally in the Go/No-go task, and
showed an abnormal N2 signal. Source location analyses show
the involvement of a broad network of frontal and prefrontal
areas (but not of prelimbic and limbic areas) in the generation
of N2, as well as left BA10 and BA11 abnormal involvement in
N2 in the group of cocaine addicts. This pattern of neurophysio-
logic results is in agreement with the existence of an association
between cocaine consumption and malfunctioning of inhibition
mechanisms, at least partially due to neurotoxic, cocaine exposure
effects.
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